In contrast to this, the two modern constitutional revolutions were not precipitated by the maturing of internal forces over a long period. They were assimilative reactions to Western legal traditions. As a result, contemporary Japanese law blends traditional elements with European (especially German) civil law and legal theory, and Anglo-American common law traditions. In this article I offer some data and reflections on (I) prewar and present Japanese constitutionalism and the revision debate; (2) legal culture, embracing the legal system and values, as related to such issues as freedom of expression; and (3) some pending problems in Japanese constitutional law.
The Two Modern Constitutional Revolutions
Pre-I945 concepts of constitutionalism and law affect legal interpretation and debate today. Many leading judges, prosecutors, legal (1) 2 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES scholars and lawyers have had to straddle mentally two constitutional eras, and received much of their formative training and experience under the pre-I945 legal system. The Meiji constitutional revolution (I868-I945) 2 institutionalized the system against which much of the post-I945 constitutional system has been a reaction, but also laid the foundation for aspects of the post-I 945 revolution.
Study of the law, administrative practice and police developments affecting freedom of expression between I 868 and I 945 suggests that most parts of a thorough system for restraining free speech had fallen into place by I9I3 after piecemeal development, and that enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law of I925 and subsequent related law brought a final touch of unusual sophistication to the pre-I945 system of control, for which the military were not as responsible as sometimes assumed.
3 Neither the legal system nor traditional culture seems to have honored individual rights, as rights came to be understood inJapanese law under Western influence.
Rights and freedoms were quite new concepts in Meiji Japan. However, the absence in Japan of a long and coherent tradition of liberalism does not imply that the Meiji constitutional revolution did not vastly expand pre-existing group tendencies to assertion for and against policies in accord with their sense ofjustice and self-interest. 4 In general, the maintenance of civil liberties in a country does not depend on explicit emphasis in law or society upon rights and freedoms, as understood in the law and intellectual traditions of the West, but on: (I) a mixture of institutionalized values which taken together favor liberty; ( 2) the existence of competitive, as opposed to authoritarian, politics; (3) actual expression of agreement or dissent on substantive issues along with the possibility of dissent with impunity; (4) such a balance of social 3 and political forces that those favoring rights outweigh those opposed. 5 The sociological interplay of such factors in Japan from the 186os through the 1930s resulted in a growing awareness of individual legal rights, as understood today inJapanese and Western law, among many scholars, officials and other citizens at the same time that a modern system of political repression was being refined and increasingly enforced in service to the Emperor.
The constitutional system of Japan today, reflecting a quite different interplay of factors, stresses enforcement of individual rights. The present widespread acceptance of the constitution in Japan rests in part on a continuing reaction against a prewar system that failed in the mind-numbing defeat of the Second World War. It does not seem probable that Japan would soon have become a constitutional democracy without the shock of losing the Pacific War and without massive Occupation support for Japan's liberal forces. 6 Modern political systems which are systematically authoritarian, whether left or right in orientation and however inefficient in light of abstract goals, appear much simpler to maintain as regimes than constitutional democracies. Japan's authoritarian apparatus, by comparative standards, was efficient in its methods of political control during the militarist period, and not likely to evolve along more liberal lines.
The widespread, deep, and genuine loyalty to the emperor-nation of that earlier era is not much discussed in public today, and is perhaps remembered more often with embarrassment than with pride. The rejection now of significant military power under the pacifist provisions of Article 9 7 and the denial of power to the Emperor under Chapter 1 8 of 4 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES the constitution seem intimatejy linked in theJ apanese mind to the utter national failure resulting from total and militant loyalty to the Emperor. Just as prewar children were programmatically indoctrinated in kokutai ideology, so postwar children have been conditioned systematically to believe in freedom ever since the first student was required to memorize the new constitution during the Occupation (I 945-52) . 9 The shock of those who had believed unquestioningly in the invincibility of the nation under the Emperor, although profound, is as difficult to convey to today's youth as it is to make real to America's affluent youth the depression years. Closely associated in the collective memory of the 'militarist period' is the severe, even irrational, limitation of the freedom of thought, the freedom of expression, and other individual rights. The radical postwar rejection by the overwhelming majority of the prewar military-bureaucratic system, which is seen as having misused the imperial institution for its own ends, explains in part why efforts to alter notably the status of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, or the Emperor, or individual rights are perceived by many liberal and leftistjapanese as an attempt to rip apart the entire fair fabric of the I 94 7 constitution, and not simply as an attempt to modify one of its elements. Whether or not this perception represents a persuasive assessment of relationships, the three parts are commonly seen as crucial and inseparable; no other components of the new constitutional structure arouse such noteworthy emotion. More power to the Emperor would mean, it is thought, more power to the military which would mean expanded police powers and less democratic freedom; and conversely, strict limitation of imperial and military functions in government is necessary to assure the maintenance and development of constitutional rights. In sum, the term 'Peace Constitution' is used injapan as a reference to the anti-militarist provisions of the constitution, its guarantee of individual rights, and imperial powerlessness.
potential, and which, owing to japan's industrial potential, is considerable. C. Johnson, 'Omote (Explicit) and Ura (Implicit): Translating japanese Political Terms,' Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1980) ' Law in Japan: An Annual, Vol. 8 (1975) , 67-go; Ronald Suleski, 'A New Generation of japanese Intellectuals, ' Japan Foundation Newsletter, 6, No. 4 (October-November, 1978) , pp. ID-12.
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The Revision Controversy
The Constitution of Japan has not been amended even once, as the constitutional revolution of postwar Japan has continued to take root. As it has been applied, it seems sufficiently flexible to remove any pressing need for amendment. The Meiji Constitution was never amended, unless the establishment of the present constitution is viewed technically as a constitutional amendment.
10 The aspects of perception described above seem a critical factor underlying the seriousness of academic, legal and political debate on questions of constitutional interpretation and revision over the past thirty years. A litmus test applied to scholars and politicians, as well as to laws and judicial decisions on many issues is how they relate to the tripartite revision issue. So thoroughly integrated into political and legal rhetoric is this constitutional sensitivity that court cases concerning a wide range of subjects-for example, history textbook certification, academic freedom, demonstrations, the rating of teachers, and the Japan-United States Security Treaty-have evoked references to all aspects of the tripartite image of Emperor, military, and individual rights.
Once the Allied Occupation ended in I952, the revision controversy gathered momentum and reached a peak during the mid-and late-I950s following the formation of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party USP) by coalitions of smaller parties. Some powerful LDP leaders wanted revision precisely to strengthen the positions of the Emperor and the military and to limit individual rights; but this does not mean a widespread desire existed in the LDP for a return to the political system of the wartime period from the Manchurian Incident (I 93 I) till late I 945, during which period bureaucrats and militarists decisively replaced elected party politicians as top leaders of the government.
11
10 The Constitution of japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into effect on May 3, 1947· The amendment provision in The Constitution of the Empire of Japan was as follows: 'Article 73· When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.
'2. In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained. ' Tanaka, Japanese Legal System, p. 23. 11 On the history of the revision controversy, see Haruhiro Fukui, 'The Liberal Democratic Party and Constitutional Revision,' in David Sissons ( ed.), Papers on Modern Japan (Canberra: Australian University Press, 1968), and 'Twenty Years of Revi-
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At least six factors seem to have virtually eliminated the probability of wholesale constitutional revision in Japan's near future, assuming no severe economic upheaval:
(I) The Security Treaty Crisis of I 960 seems to have been more of a community rite affirming consensual democracy than an anti-treaty or revolutionary struggle.
12 It was the largest mass movement inJapanese history, 13 and it may well have suggested to LDP leaders such as Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato that an effort at major constitutional change, whether needed or not, would awaken organized opposition on a much grander scale than that of I 960.
( Vol. 9 (1976}, pp. 129-43. 12 Max Gluckman's distinction between 'rituals of rebellion' and 'revolution' may apply to the 196o Security Treaty Crisis and to some aspects of the University Crisis of 1969. Revolution seeks to overthrow the whole existing order, while ritual rebellion, which may be a luxury limited to societies like Japan with a stable established order, reaffirm the system in venting tensions between leaders and led and between viewpoints. In this connection, see Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa and Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society; and Takeo Doi Uohn Bester, trans.), Anatomy of Dependence (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973 16 Most feel there are greater internal than external threats to the system, and even internal threats are minimal. Second, Article 9 has operated in such a way that the military has been removed from the political drama, and, barring an unforeseeable crisis, this has negated the possibility of a military coup d'etat in Japan. If Japan had a conventional constitution, without Article 9, a strong military, whatever its political alignments, would have at its disposal the instruments of coercion which,] apanese history suggests, it would not be reticent to use politically.
(3) The issuance in I 964, under the leadership of Professor Takayanagi Kenzo, of a non-committal final report by the Commission on the Constitution (I 95 7-64; Kenpo Chosakai) also discouraged further revision efforts, at least for some time. No recommendations for amendment were made after six years of hearings, study, and debate. 17 From its inception, many critics viewed the Commission as a revisionist tool; if such was the original intent of the LDP, it was frustrated. Many scholars and politicians refused to participate in or support the Commission's activities. Whether their participation would have added even greater force to the Commission's final refusal to recommend changes is a moot point. In any case, many opponents of the Commission were actively involved in parallel study groups, which included Commission members, during the long debate over every important and technical provision of the Constitution of Japan. In its function, this debate may be viewed as a Japanese-style constitutional convention, with long consultations at home and abroad, and widespread debates in pursuit of national consensus. japan had had no opportunity for such a 'convention' under the Occupation.
(4) In the late I 940s and early I 950s, food, clothing, and other basic needs were the preoccupations of most, leaving a small minority to 8 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES debate ideologies and constitutional ideas. The postwar revolution of thought had a slow start. By far the most frequently cited reason in I 979 for Japan's peace since World War II was 'the personally experienced misery of war,' 18 and popular support for the 'peace constitution' is perhaps equally attributable to that experience, at least initially. The fact is that popular assimilation and support for the constitution has grown, and militates strongly against revision. This has been primarily the result of education, accumulating experience of the operation of the constitution, prosperity, the absence of any appealing alternative, the work of the Commission on the Constitution, and the long-term absence of a perceived external military threat.
(5) The LDP lost in the late I 96os and I 970s the overwhelming parliamentary power necessary to revise the constitution. This, and factional differences within the LDP render revision very unlikely. Inside and outside the political parties, Japan has many power centers, groups organized along relatively non-authoritarian, quasi-familial lines. A few such centers seem dominant-such as the ruling political party, the Ministries (especially the Finance Ministry), the judiciary, mass media combines, and industry federations-with lesser interest groups or domains filling out the system. In general, loyalty to the small face-to-face group is primary, 19 and it is quite common for such groups or factions to be in competition with, or at best indifferent to, the others. But they can also freely enter into alliances of mutual benefit, usually for limited periods and for particular purposes. This often happens, for example, among factions of the LDP, and this capacity for making and breaking alliances makes the system dynamic and highly organized. But a consensus within the LDP to revise the constitution is certainly not readily foreseeable, and cooperation with other political parties is much more unlikely. The distribution of seats in the Diet remains fairly stable, the LDP's capacity to retain control of the Diet being primarily due to the absence of an alternative appealing to the voters. In July I98o, even after an atypical LDP landslide victory, the LDP's 286 seats out of 5 I I in the lower house and • 20 The distribution of seats in both Houses of the Diet injuly I98o was as below. For perspective, statistics after the prior two lower house elections and the last upper house election are included. The sudden jump in LDP strength in I98o was attendant to the 9 short of the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution.
21
(6) Also militating against constitutional revision is the institutionalization of the Constitution ofjapan through law and judicial decisions. The district, high and Supreme Courts of Japan have been much too diverse in their ideological leanings and interpretive methods to allow blanket characterizations of judicial performance since 194 7 with respect to constitutional law. But the net cumulative effect of their work in millions of cases, civil, criminal and administrative, has significantly strengthened the roots of rule of law democracy in Japanese soil. 22 In In the 1970s, independents usually joined with the LDP, thus assuring it a parliamentary majority. The New Liberal Club is a moderate conservative group which split off from the LDP in the mid-1970s, but often votes with it. 21 The Constitution of Japan, Article 96: 'Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.
'2. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.' ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Cas! Law of Japan, p. 268. 22 addition, family courts, Civil Liberties Commissioners, and Local Administrative Counselors have also brought the law of the constitution to bear in resolving millions of disputes in a quiet atmosphere.
23 District courts more often than appellate courts 24 have stressed civil liberties in their findings; but even the now conservative Supreme Court has notably nurtured proc~dural rights of the accused 25 while allowing creeping restraints on the .rights of public employees, on and off the job.
26 (Other examples are discussed later.) The courts are restrained by an insufficiency of judges, dilatory trial proceedings, jurisprudence that is sometimes restrictive, and other factors touched on later. In general, the courts have guarded jealously their tradition since the Meiji period 27 of judicial independence in deciding individual cases; they have also upheld their institutional prerogatives in dealing with the Diet and administrators.
Legal professionals as well as politicians, ranging from rightists to moderate liberals to democratic socialists to those who view Marxists as rank conservatives, seem cautious about the intentions of their political 23 Family courts, summary courts, and various modes oflay participation in dispute resolution are briefly described in Justice in Japan. pp. 14-17, 23-6. 21 The Otsu Case (1891) and the Meiji Constitution established judicial independence for the first time in Japan. As Kenzo Takayanagi notes: 'In a sense, the Otsu Incident and its legacy contradict the basic thesis advanced by the Western scholars interviewed by Kaneko: the inclusion in the Constitution of~n institution quite foreign to the Japanese scene provided the foundation on which a tradition of judicial independence very quickly emerged.' Takayanagi, supra n. 
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foes on the revision issue. It is more a debate among elites who would speak on behalf of the citizenry than an issue like economics or education preoccupying the public in general. Many Japanese of otherwise differing views would like the revision controversy to cool down sufficiently to allow a complete rewriting of the Constitution of Japan into appropriateJapanese language without changing the intent of any important provision. That may of course be an impossible dream; but the present translation into Japanese of some parts originally in English is not adequate, and may be an unnecessary reminder of the document's Occupation-period origins.
28
Some anti-revisionists maintain the LDP policies and the decisions of conservative courts have already revised the constitution in fact, if not formally, in pursuit of a 'reverse course' preference for the prewar order.
29 Surely, in Japan as in past and present democratic law and politics the world over, one can find much evidence of an abiding preference for anti-democratic policies and judicial decisions at both the official and private levels of society; but the contention that substantive constitutional revision has occurred seems a doubtful political judgment and an oversimplification of the tasks of courts in Japan, unless by 'revision' one really means 'interpretation' which one finds needlessly restrictive. Moreover, the problems in interpreting the Article 9 'no war clause' are unprecedented in world judicial history; they cannot be solved or whisked away by too facile a use of'political question' doctrine, the view in law that courts have no right to decide certain politically sensitive issues such as those affecting national security. 30 Japan's power centers criticize each other for wrong-headedness regarding the constitution, and in doing so they manifest the competitive politics essential to the maintenance of liberties. Anti-revisionists retain sensitivity to the repressive past and show awareness that democracy is a vulnerable system oflaw and government always in some respects in tension with its professed ideals.
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Japan's Constitutional Theory
The Constitution ofJapan is now the most-authoritative reference point for public values in Japan and is, as Edward Seidensticker has noted, 'among the Sacred Books of the East. ' 31 The constitution's theoretical thrust is based on natural law suppositions and on the attribution of intrinsic value to the individual person. So many formal philosophies and ideologies co-exist inJ a pan's political and intellectual worlds that it is hard to discern any agreed-upon general theory underpinning Japanese constitutional democracy. Among the pillars and struts of Japanese thought are traditional ideas drawn from Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto, as well as theories related to Christianity and Marxism; but how they relate to each other, if at all, is elusive. 32 But it is clear that customary law has had a powerful influence. Though generally unwritten, these rules are partially expressed in such documents as company rules. 33 A sophisticated syste~ of rules with effective sanctions governs oyabun-kobun (quasi-parental-filial) group structures 34 and gives specificity to such motive forces as amae (reciprocal dependency)35 and loyalty. Nagao Ryiiichi suggests that a better understanding of the enigmatic urge to absolute loyalty-not simply to loyaltymay be a key to understanding the history of Japanese social and political ideas. variance with the constitution is analysis of the reasons given by voters for their voting preferences. An attitude study of I ,500 Tokyo voters was made in I978 by a team ofjapanese scholars.
37 Analysis indicated that ideology and party preference were relatively unimportant. The single most important determinant of political choice (the key factor to 29 percent of voters, and a major factor to 53 percent) 38 was the image of the candidate as expressing and supporting traditional values and what might be termed 'the good Japanese way' of doing things. But a most striking contrast to this preference for traditionalism in the personal style of candidates is found in the analysis of the positive elements in the images which voters entertained ofliberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism: the most likely to succeed were candidates, ideologies, and parties presenting an image of flexibility, modernity, conservatism, and economic egalitarianism somehow combined. For maximum legitimacy, a leader was seen as combining great respect for traditional values and modes of human interaction with concern for constitutional freedoms and economic policies promoting equality. Forty-two percent of the voters studied considered themselves entirely unaffected by political ideologies such as the four above; only I percent consider· socialism-communism preferable in general to liberalism-capitalism, but only IO percent rate the latter pairing preferable to the former.
Along with the strong support for Article 9 pacifism (not a general philosophy of pacifism) referred to earlier, values such as hierarchy, equality, groupism, freedom and loyalty form at least part of the structure of operative constitutional theory in japan. Replacing in some measure and without much emotion their earlier loyalty to the Emperor, perhaps the generality of japanese now share a loyalty to the 37 Hayashi Chikio et at., Nipponjin no kokuminsei (Shiseido, 1970) ; and Hayashi Chikio, 'Seiji ishiki no seitai, ' Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 1978, p . 4· See also the comprehensive survey report in Asahi Shinbun,January 1, 1979, pp. 1, Io-13.
The term 'feudal,' often used pejoratively to criticize traditional aspects of modern Japan, is usually applied to factors such as the family system which predated feudalism by centuries and which made japanese feudalism different from other feudalisms such as those of Western Europe. See F. Joiion des Longrais, L'est et /'ouest, institutions du Japon et de /'occident comparees (Paris and Tokyo, 1958) . This writer does not share a uniformly negative view of Japanese-style.'feudalism' as it functions today. 38 Hayashi, 'Seiji ishiki no seitai.' Only a small percentage (c. 20%) of japanese expressed much trust in politicians in late 1978 compared, for example, to tax officials (c. 45 %) , judges, teachers, police, doctors, newspapers, and weather forecasters, among whom the last in the ascending order were the most trusted. Asahi Shinbun, October 22, 1978 andj anuary 1, '979· My only explanation for the extraordinary trust offorecllSters is good-humored japanese stress on distrust of other categories. Newspapers are trusted institutions, but the results may have been skewed to their advantage by the fact that the newspapers did the polling. 14 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES constitution, not as a formal document, but as a summation of preferred values and guidelines for public action. What the constitution rejects seems as important as the rights it guarantees, but the whole structure rests on a recognition of the equal dignity of each individual. As the late constitutional lawyer Miyazawa Toshiyoshi once expressed it, while contrasting prewar and postwar Japan, 'Every day I enjoy breathing freedom again.'
Constitutional Culture and Law
The core new element in post-I945Japanese constitutionalism is legally protected freedom and individual rights, based primarily on the Preamble and Chapter III (Articles IO to 40) of the constitution.
39
Japan would very likely be a well-organized (some might say, over-organized) nation under almost any imaginable governmental system; but much was added to order by the present constitutional revolution. The Preamble proclaims that 'sovereign power resides with the people,' and Article I 3 that 'all of the people shall be respected as individuals.' This abstract latter provision has been invoked by the courts as the textual basis for both establishing and limiting certain constitutional rights. The individual person has replaced the Emperor as the highest public value. The Emperor is a 'symbol of the State and of the unity of the people' (Article I); and 'he shall not have powers related to government' (Article 4). This is the first time the powers of the Emperor have ever been legally limited, although historically he seldom, and, since I 868, almost never, actually exercised any political powers. Although continuities do exist which link present and prewar institutions, significant changes have been made in their organization and function.
40 The Cabinet has no military membership and is collectively responsible to the Diet (Article 66). Constitutional rights, although in fact sometimes subordinate to informal in-group pressures 39 The Constitution of Japan, Article 97 in the 'Supreme Law' chapter of the constitution reads: 'The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate. and bureaucratic presumptions, are more freely exercised than in prewar Japan, vastly expanded in scope, usually honored by the police, and justiciable or conciliable in public tribunals. 41 The mass media serve more adequately than before as a quasi-constitutional Fourth Estate, a power center relatively independent of any political party or Ministry, without which Japanese democracy might crumble.
42 The Diet is the 'highest organ of State power' (Article 41) except for the ruling political party, yet subject to judicial review (Article 81) of the constitutionality of its official acts. 43 The court system, supervised by the Supreme Court, is judicially and administratively independent. Finally, the status of women has improved markedly, in both fact and law. 44 The Supreme Court and lower courts have the 'power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act'; 45 but like most court systems, they exercise this power against other branches of government only rarely. They are further restrained by predominantly civil law perceptions of the judicial role in government, a role of democratic deference to the elected parliament. 46 The on future law of a judgment of unconstitutionality is still debated, but a 'conclusion in a decision of a superior court shall bind courts below in respect of the case concerned,' and not in general. 47 For example, if a legal provision is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it is nevertheless possible that the same or other courts may rule differently in other cases on the same issue, and it is possible that the Diet will not pass remedial legislation to remove the offending provision. A judgment of unconstitutionality does not necessarily trigger among lawyers, legal scholars, mass media leaders or politicians the requisite sustained pressure on the Diet to take legislative action to support such a judgment.
48 If the judicial decision is that an official action is invalid, no court doctrine has resolved the scholarly debate on whether some legal provision enables a court to order an administrative agency to take remedial action. 49 Article 37 of the constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal case 'the right to a speedy and public trial'; but some controversial cases have languished in the courts for a decade or even two (e.g., the 1952 May Day Incident decisions of the 1970s), and years of delay are commonplace. Widely spaced trial sessions characterize Japan's civil law system, courts have been used at times as political forums, causing additional delays, and judges are generally meticulous in moving slowly towards a decision. These factors may constitute a systematic obstacle to quick justice.
The conviction rate in Japan is extremely high, approaching 99 percent. But in recent years criminological reasons, rather than insufficient evidence have led prosecutors not to prosecute around 40 percent of serious violations of the Criminal Code. A lay Inquest of Prosecution regularly reviews a prosecutor's determinations on whether or not to file charges; these organs recommend a change or indictment or a reinvestigation of the case about 10 percent of the time, and such ·recommendations are accepted by the Chief of the District Public Prosecutor's Office in 30 percent of the cases. 50 than 4 percent of persons convicted were given a jail sentence and almost two-thirds of those were suspended. Over g6 percent of persons convicted of a crime were punished only with a fine,' usually a small fine. Forty-four and seven-tenths percent of the convicted went to prison in the United States that year, and for much longer periods than the Japanese sentenced. Criminal justice in Japan is generally not severe. Freedom of expression is a sine qua non of any constitutional democracy. A review of the status offreedom of expression will thus be a particularly useful way of conveying reasonably reliable perspectives on the state ofJapan's democratic law. Issues to be touched on include the freedom to demonstrate, mass media freedom, privacy, obscenity, and textbook certification.
The Law of Demonstrations
In any assessment of the strength of freedom, we need to study judicial decisions, which are the backbone of the law on liberty, but especially where values differ from Western ones, we need to understand the society in order to comprehend how law is perceived and how it functions. For example, the Japanese commitment to groupism instead of to individualism has not, and does not, prevent people from resorting to the law to protect their rights and interests. 51 Nor has it been an obstacle to the people's support for the freedom of expression. 52 But it has affected the forms that these take.
There is a strong sense of group right rather than individual right in public contexts, analogous to an individualist sense of right in the West. Largely due to this, privately and freely organized demonstrations have been very frequent in postwar Japan. Freedom of association and freedom of assembly have been central aspects of freedom of expression in Japan, and contrast sharply to the prewar suppression of these freedoms. Highly vocal but nonviolent group dissent or advocacy by groups seems more fully accepted public behavior in Japan than in the United States. 53 but the most important are the local 'public safety ordinances' (koan jorei) and 'public safety commissions' (koan iinkai) of prefectures or cities. 56 The key constitutional provision on freedom of expression is Article 2I:
Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. 2. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.
Basic Supreme Court doctrine on demonstrations and other 'collective activities' was laid down in the landmark Tokyo Ordinance Decision in Ig6o, 57 which held that local authorities are obliged under public safety ordinances to grant permits with 'maximum respect for freedom of expression.' Denial of a permit is legitimate only when a collective activity 'will directly endanger the maintenance of the public peace' and thus contravene 'the public welfare' (kokyo no fukushi).
Later judicial decisions have followed and refined Tokyo doctrine.
58
Although the 'public welfare' was defined early (I 950) by the Supreme Court as 'the maintenance of order and respect for the fundamental human rights of the individual,' 59 for many years the judicial use of the term has evoked unease and protest from many constitutional lawyers and opposition politicians. 'Public welfare' has reminded them of terms used during the ultra-nationalist period to urge all to forget their own interests and revere the Emperor. 60 one's group is relatively uninhibited (except by the seniority order of presentation), as is expression of group disagreement with government policies or the opinions of' outsiders' of whatever kind. See Beer in ibid. 54 One of the most significant developments in constitutional law since I 94 7 may be the decreased use, especially in the lower courts, of abstract formulations of public welfare doctrine, and increased specificity since I965. 61 The courts have honed more concrete criteria for determining what the public welfare is in each class of cases. These technical developments are in some cases due more to changes in judicial education, the influence of legal scholars, and accumulated judicial experience under the I947 constitution than to liberalism. For example, Tokyo doctrine, which was handed down in the aftermath of the I 960 Security Treaty Crisis, deemphasized the place where demonstrations are held. In fact, Tokyo upholds the right of authorities to regulate mass demonstrations 'in any place whatsoever,' contending that debate on such matters as place is 'completely profitless.' But a 1970 Supreme Court decision hinged upon the meaning of 'public place' (kokyo no basho) in the Hiroshima prefectural ordinance. It was defined by the judges as 'a place which in reality is generally open and can be used and entered freely by unspecified persons.'
62 The ordinance requires a permit only for a demonstration which is to take place in a public place. The accused were public employees who staged a demonstration outside the prefectural capitol building without obtaining a permit. They contended the ordinance did not apply, since the location of the demonstration was not a public place; the judges disagreed, and they lost their case.
Vigorous exercise of the freedom to demonstrate by groups representing local and national interests will likely continue little affected by adverse court decisions. Most public group actions injapan are orderly and peaceful, and are often attended with colorful pageantry and a festival spirit, a healthy blend of seriousness and play. Convictions for illegal collective activities are usually for physical obstruction or violence which would be held illegal in most or all of the world's other democratic courts; and as noted earlier,Japan's courts are quite lenient in sentencing. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been criticized when it has overturned acquittals handed down by both a trial court and an appellate court; this it did about twenty times between I 974 and I 979 in civil liberties cases. The ever-clearer restriction in the political activities of public employees to voting alone deserves special mention. In the late 1 96os, the Supreme Court recognized that different degrees of restraint are appropriate to a management-level official in a Ministry and a janitor in the public monopoly tobacco corporation. 63 But between 1973 and 1978, decisions of the Supreme Court affected adversely the political freedom of public employees.
In the famous Sarufutsu Case, 64 for example, a postal employee was convicted for putting up six political posters on a public bulletin board during his leisure hours. The issues still debated include the proper delineation of limits on the rights of teachers, postal workers, telecommunications workers, and transportation workers to strike or to engage in political activities, and whether administrative discipline (most common), criminal penalties or no punishment should be applied for related violations of the laws governing public employees.
Some Aspects of Freedom for the Mass Media
Along with group activism, freedom of the press is particularly close to the core ofjapanese democracy, because the mass media may represent the only power centers that are effectively organized, separate from the government, linked with important people and groups, especially in Tokyo and Osaka, and whose influences spread throughout the nation.
Japan's print and broadcast media are mammoth in scale, technologically impressive, and socially pervasive. 65 Daily newspapers with nationwide circulation like the Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, and Nihon Keizai Shinbun print over fifty million copies each day, about twenty percent of which are distributed in Tokyo. The newspapers' political roles are complex, although the major papers do not 63 See, for example, Japan v. Sakane et al., supra n. I5, and Toyama et al. v. Japan, 20 Keishii (No. 8) (Iwanami Shinsho, 1978) . endorse political candidates. For example, the press helped to sustain the crisis atmosphere for a time during the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, they moderated the tension in most cases during the nationwide University Crisis of 1g68-6g, they massively publicized the Lockheed scandals and trials during the 1970s after disclosures were made in the United States, and they have played a major role in activating, publicizing and supporting the consensus against pollution since 1970. The principal organization for newspapers, television and radio is the Nihon Shinbun Kyokai Qapan Newspaper Editors and Publishers Association), which at times when a need is felt can form a cohesive power center by alliance among its leaders in the face of external threat. For example, during the Hakata Station Film Controversy of 1969, the media united to oppose a court order for evidence to be presented (TV film of a student-police confrontation) in the alleged absence of other or better evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the courts' prerogatives after months of well-organized media reistance.
The University of Missouri world survey of press freedom rates japan highly, but has noted industry centralization and self-regulation as problems. On the latter score, the 'kisha kurabu' (press clubs) attached to politicians or agencies may be mentioned. Reporters from competing papers do not so much compete for news, as they form a coherent group which may determine when what news is suitable for release to their respective papers. Stable ties can develop between a 'reliable source' and a press club; the wishes of both the club and the source may heavily influence what a reporter decides to convey to the public. (Foreign correspondents are not welcome.) There is some merit in the system, because secrecy-loving officials would probably obstruct access to information more substantially, if the cordial relations of mutual trust with the press did not exist. On the other hand, this system of agency-media and reporter-reporter relations too effectively limits the freedom ofinformation, and is one reason why news of such affairs as the Lockheed scandals derived first from foreign sources rather than from Japanese investigative journalism. The right of access to information (akusesuken) and the individual's right to know have been major themes studied by specialists such as Ito Masami, Shimizu Hideo, Okudaira Yasuhiro, and Horibe Masao.
In the Nishiyama Decision of 1978, 66 the Supreme Court made its first ruling on the relationships between state secrets and newsgathering.
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While attached to the Foreign Ministry, Nishiyama Takichi, a reporter for the Mainichi Shinbun, gained access to secret cables on the negotiation of terms for the reversion ofOkinawa to japan. Nishiyama had received this information from Hasumi Kikuko, a girl friend working in the Ministry. At a Diet committee meeting on March 27, I972, a Socialist OSP) member made the contents of the cables, received somehow from Nishiyama, a part of his attack on government policies. The documents contradicted the government's earlier assurances that no secret agreements had been made with the U.S. The Supreme Court held: (I) that the courts have the authority to determine what constitutes a state secret under the National Public Employees Law (and what, for example, is merely a political secret); (2) that the government's secrecy regarding international negotiations in this case was appropriate; (3) that the government's failure to bring the full facts before the Diet did not conflict with the constitutional order or constitute illegal secrecy; and (4) that although free newsgathering and reporting are of special importance to the people's democratic right to know and freedom of expression generally, Nishiyama violated the legal prohibition against inducing divulgence of official secrets by a public employee in his ethically questionable relationship with Hasumi, a married woman.
The right of privacy has been another noteworthy issue in recent law. Expanded press freedom since I 945 has occasioned an increase in journalistic excursions into the private lives of political leaders, other public figures, and ordinary citizens (unknown but for a cruel expose).
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The former have served the people's right to know about and criticize the famous and the powerful. According to a survey, both well-known and unknown victims of defamation and violation of privacy more often suffer in silence and 'go to bed weeping' (nakineiri suru) than assert their legal rights as individuals. The consensus among scholars seems to be that there have been too few legal charges lodged by victims. Where any redress has been sought, the more common solution has been a conciliatory out-of-court settlement with public and private apologies and monetary compensation by publishers. Courts and scholars alike have strongly supported the rights to privacy (puraibashii) and good name, but there seems to have been a low demand for the legal protection of these rights at least until the I970S. In sharp contrast to official secrecy, the right of privacy seems to have been less honored in group-oriented Japan than the right of families, occupational groups or other groups or communities to know about the affairs of their members, and to impose sanctions for deviance. For example, the institution of ostracism from the community (mura hachibu) for non-conformity is a persistent problem, according to Japan's Civil Liberties Bureau. 68 On the other hand, if one values the positive aspects of the strong Japanese sense of community, one must hope that a stress on privacy rights will not unduly disturb it.
The constitutional right of privacy was first established inJapan not by a law, but by a I964 Tokyo district court decision against Mishima Yukio in a case involving his novel Utage no A to (After the Banquet). 69 The novel, serialized in Chuo lloron in I g6 I, dealt in thinly veiled fashion with marital affairs of Arita Hachiro, a Socialist OSP) politician and unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in the I g6o Tokyo elections. Arita sued Mishima, who was ordered to pay a substantial amount in damages. The emergence of the right of privacy is an example of the considerable influence of Japanese legal scholars on some areas of the law, the fruitful interaction of campus and court, and the importation of a legal concept from American law into Japanese legal discourse.
I>H Conversation with Onizuka Kentaro, Head, Civil Liberties Bureau, Justice Ministry, October, 1978. See Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan,' p. 13. Mura hachibu, ostracism from the village, was the prototype of this powerful sanction, but for the Tokugawa period, machi hachibu (ostracism from commercial districts of towns and cities) was also common. See Nihon Kei<.ai ]iten (Nihon hyoronsha, 1943), p. 1844-Today mura hachibu is the official catch-all term for illegal ostracism. In the cities, mura hachibu may even include ostracism of a housewife in a modern apartment complex by other women living there. 'Article 710. A person who is liable in compensation for damages in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article shall make compensation therefor even in respect of a nonpecuniary damage, irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty or reputation of another or to his property rights.'
A theory which would directly apply such constitutional guarantees as good name and privacy without reference to code provisions seems to have little support. See lJkai in Beer, Constitutionalism in Asia, p. 1 22; and Ashibe, Kenpo, pp. 39-97·
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The constitutional basis for the privacy right is found in the sentence, 'All of the people shall be respected as individuals' in Article I 3, while code law provision is detected in Articles 709 and 7IO ofthe Civil Code, under which a person is bound to make compensation for intentional or negligent violation of the right of another, whether 'injury was to the person, liberty, or rep~tation of another or to his property rights.' Among other noteworthy privacy cases are the following:
(I) A I 969 Supreme Court decision held that, as an aspect of the right of privacy, one has the right not to be photographed against one's will during an illegal demonstration unless the photography was necessary to a criminal investigation.
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(2) A I969 Tokyo high court decision in the Kato Case required a weekly magazine to pay remuneration and to apologize publicly in a national newspaper, on grounds of damage to good name and privacy rights.
71 The magazine at issue claimed that two famous TV and film personalities cohabited before marriage, which was denied.
(3) In I 970, an injunction to ban the showing of an art film on the grounds of privacy violation was denied.
72 The film dealt with the early amorous and political affairs of an elderly feminist politician, Kamichika Ichiko; but she herself had publicized her private life on a number of prior occasions, thus negating in the court's view the confidentiality factor necessary for a valid claim of privacy violation.
(4) The I977 Kawabata Case was settled out of court with public apologies for lack of circumspection. The bereaved family of the late Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Kawabata Yasunari, sued the publisher and author of a novel which suggested that Kawabata's I972 suicide was linked to indiscreet relations with the family maid, apparently an outcast burakumin. exemplifies the utility of analyzing the side effects of specific legal changes. 74 An important but unintended and unforeseen byproduct of legal change in one issue area affected the effects and applications oflaw in another. Prior to I970, very few civil defamation suits had been brought to court compared, for example, to German and French experience under similar defamation laws. 75 In the early I970s, the success of groups and individuals bringing civil suits against companies for injury or illness caused by pollution was thoroughly publicized. As a result, popular awareness of the possibility of effective court action against newspapers and other media enterprises for civil defamation rose dramatically, and so did the number of successful suits.
•
The obscenity question is another media-related issue affected by the second modern constitutional revolution. Under Article I 75 of the Criminal Code, various laws regulating the media, the police laws, obscenity regulation, public security maintenance and thought control were sometimes linked in the Japanese official mind before I945.
77
Today, such connections are seen by few officials and citizens. Since the Occupation period, Japan has been again rather tolerant, producing large numbers of erotic books, pictures, magazines, comic books, advertisements, TV broadcasts, motion pictures and tape recordings. 82 'In order for a writing to be obscene, it is required that it wantonly arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal sense of shame, and run counter to proper concepts of sexual morality.'
The Chatterley decision has continued to draw criticism from liberal scholars for arrogating to the courts 'a clinical role' in the event society's moral views become lax. In de Sade, the court generally followed Chatterley doctrine, but seemed to some analysts to stress artistry and intellectual values more than Chatterley in the following passage:
83
There may be cases where the artistry and intellectual content of a work may diminish and moderate the sexual stimulus caused by its portrayal of sex to a degree less than that which is the object of punishment in the Criminal Code, so as to negate obscenity ....
Dissenting opinions denied the obscenity of the partial translation of de Sade's In Praise of Vice either because of its artistic and intellectual content, or because its sadistic repulsiveness reduced its erotic appeal to insignificance. Majority doctrine is regarded by commentators as somewhat restrictive.
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While providing binding guidelines for official Japan, judicial decisions do not give much hint of the systems for purveying and regulating obscenity in Japan. Critical to freedom of erotica are public agencies and private regulatory agencies connected with different industries. For example, the major motion picture producer-distributors abide by decisions of their own Motion Picture Ethics Committee (Eiga Rinrikitei Kanri Iinkai, or Eirin) 89 The constitutionality of this system is questioned by scholars, and some judges. In the first test case reaching the appellate level-one involving a challenge to a denial of permission to import nude picture books-the Supreme Court in I 979 ordered a retrial favoring the challenge, but did not clearly present its own doctrine.
90
Frank and undisguised pornographic writings with the traditional designation of shunpon (literally, springtime books), can be found in specialized shops and do not often generate widespread concern. Weekly pulp magazines, poster advertisements, pornography vending machines, and lewd comic books for children present the most noteworthy problems today. Their content is often strongly erotic and presents a degraded image ofhumanity, especially women.
About sixty percent of japan's popular magazine sales take place in newsstands in railway stations, where concession privileges are con-28 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES trolled by the private Railroad Benefit Association (Tetsuao llosaikai).
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The RBA can forbid the sale of a magazine or a particular issue of a magazine which its officials feel might be obscene. Among other sanctions, should police seize a magazine under obscenity law, the RBA may ban the next three issues from all its newsstands.
Local systems for regulating reading material outside train stations vary. For example, the private but powerful Tokyo Newspaper Sellers Commission ( Tokyoto Shinbun Sokubai Iinkai) 92 determines the permissibility of distributing certain magazines to member newsstands and bookstores, and makes periodic spot checks to assure compliance with its policies. If objectionable material is found, a review committee considers the case and rna y issue a warning. Three warnings in a single year or one police seizure of a magazine may bring suspension of the seller's franchise. In addition, the Publications Ethics Council (Shuppan Rinri Kyogikai) has been the publishing industry's main self-regulatory agency since I 963; but it does not appear very vigorous and it is helpless vis-a-vis 'outsiders', who do not belong to the Magazine Publishers Association (,Zasshi Kyokai) or other industry organizations.
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The above and other private-sector systems of restraint combine in a complex web; they are supplemented by 39 local youth protection ordinances.
94 Ordinances such as Tokyo's encourage primary reliance upon self-regulatory systems. The Tokyo Governor may give warnings which, if not heeded, are followed by an order to stamp 'unfit for youth' on the cover of offending publications. In some cases, a dozen or more official cautions or warnings have been given before any other enforcement action was taken against pornography affecting children. 95 In 1979, parental and official concern focused on pornography vending machines within easy access of young children, and on objectionable TV advertisements and films shown during children's usual viewing As in other areas of regulation, so in restraining obscenity, particularly on behalf of children, Japanese regulatory authority is spread around among many public and private agencies, while the courts and interested scholars debate rather abstract definitions. The picture that emerges is not one of clear or simple leniency or restrictiveness, but relations between law and society resembling in complexity a kanji ideograph of 25 strokes. As William Spinrad notes in his sociology of civil liberties, formalized and just legal structures are essential to freedom, but are 'never a carbon-copy reflection of the libertarian or anti-libertarian attitudes of politicians or any general public consensus. ' 98 This applies toJapan.
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Government certification of pre-collegiate textbooks has been another object of controversy for many years, in part in reaction to the very stringent controls of prewar days. In the complicated processes of writing, publishing, local selection, and marketing of such textbooks may be found unintended restrictions on freedom which may be more· important than censorship, 100 and these problems are further complicated by the polarization of debate on some educational issues along rigid political lines. The textbook certification process takes place within the Ministry of Education. The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases significantly challenged administrative review criteria and processes with respect to textbooks, but also dramatized the continuing sensitivity of many Japanese to anything even faintly reminiscent of the thought control exercised by the prewar government. Professor Ienaga Saburo brought two suits, in rg65 and in rg67, against the Ministry of Education for requiring him to make changes in the manuscript of his revised high school history text under the Ministry's textbook certification system. Both cases 101 were on appeal in rg8o, one to the Supreme his family. 105 Among noteworthy constitutional issues now pending are: the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces; limits on the freedom of expression of public employees; delayed justice in the courts; unreviewed internal rules and processes of regulatory agencies which affect individual rights; the extent of expanding environmental rights; discrimination against burakumin (traditional outcasts), women, Okinawans, and resident aliens; and serious malapportionment of seats in the Diet.
In substance, the Supreme Court will most likely concur with the Sapporo high court in upholding the constitutionality of the SelfDefense Forces in the Naganuma Case. 106 The debate on this case in the past decade has helped to refine and clarify positions on this unique issue. Article g's pacifist provisions may well continue to be meaningful in law and politics as a unique symbol of self-restraint on military power and the constitutional order under the 'Peace Constitution,' and needs to be understood by Japan's allies. Whether a similar confluence of history, internal law and politics, and geopolitics will enable pacifism to occur in another nation-state remains to be seen.
Discrimination is a significant constitutional and human problem in Japan, although it does not receive much attention from scholars and is of interest to relatively few lawyers, politicians and citizens as yet. The Civil Liberties Bureau works imaginatively to combat discrimination through educational means and the Civil Liberties Commissioner system.
107 Social discrimination against the million Okinawans is likely to continue. The burakumin, numbering something over 1 ·5 million by government estimates and 3 million according to the Burakumin Liberation Movement, have been helped, as Japanese citizens, by remedial discrimination in the 1970s which has provided them with educational and other aid. 108 However, resident aliens, legal and illegal, have little recourse under Japanese law, and are not eligible for aid from the Civil Liberties Commissioners.
109 Most notable are roughly 65o,ooo Koreans, so,ooo Chinese, and the 2,500 unwelcome 32 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES refugees from Indochina in and out ofjapan since mid-1975.
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For the above and for women, employment discrimination is the most discussed problem. Many burakumin and aliens also suffer private restraints on their choice of a marriage partner.
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Revised rules of the LDP for the selection of the party president (and, as a consequence, the Prime Minister) which were used for the first time in late 1978 have established something comparable to a primary election system, though not preliminary, as in the United States, to a popular election for public office, but to a run-off election for party leadership. This may be viewed as a quasi-constitutional innovation, as previously the electors were limited to the parliamentary party, plus prefectural party leaders. Votes were cast by registered LDP members throughout the country in November, 1978, and Ohira Masayoshi received perhaps the highest total (more than 55o,ooo votes) ever received in an election by a single aspirant to the premiership.
112 Ohira became party president, when the second-ranking vote-getter (offour candidates), Fukuda Takeo, declined to participate in a run-off election. The new system encourages broader popular participation in LDP politics. 110 Japan came under some international pressure in I978 and I979 to allow some refugees to reside in Japan. However, as of July I979, only I2 Southeast Asian refugees had been given visas for a year or so of residence. Of wider interest in Japan with respect to rights of foreigners in Japan was the McLean Case, McLean v. Japan, Hanrei Jiho 903 (December I, I978): 3-20 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October 4, I978). The Supreme Court denied McLean, a teacher active in peaceful and legal activities opposing the American involvement in Vietnam in I969-I970, the renewal of his visa, saying that while foreign residents in Japan have the same freedom of expression under the Constitution as Japanese citizens, the Justice Ministry has discretionary authority to take into account whatever factors it thinks appropriate, including legal political activities, when determining whether or not to renew a visa. See Katsuhiko Okazaki, 'Foreign Nationals in Japan and the Human Rights Question,' The Japan Timu, December I7, I978; Kokusaikajidai no horitsu mondai, Jurisuto 68I Qanuary I, I979), ·especially pp. I3-26, 66-76. 111 Sources cited supra, n. 109; Asahi Shinbun, January 2I, I979;Joyce C. Lebra et al. (eds) , Women in Changing Japan (Boulder: Westview Press, I976); seen. I I4, irifra.
112 The LDP rules provide that one electoral point is assigned to a prefectural party chapter for every I ,ooo party members. The two national party candidates with the most votes in each prefecture divide the points in proportion to the number of votes each receives in the 'primary'. No other candidates are allotted electoral points. The voting for the four candidates in the I978 primary election was as follows: Ohira Masayoshi 550,89I (748 points); Fukuda Takeo, 472,503 (638); Nakasone Yasuhiro, I97,957 (93); Komoto Toshio, 88,9I7 (46). Asahi Shinbun, morning and evening edns, November 27, 28, and December 8, I 978. After the first round in a primary with more than two candidates in which no one has received a majority of the points, the top two vote-getters compete in a run-off election. In I978, Fukuda withdrew his candidacy before the run-off. See also Minoru Shimizu, 'LDP Reform Movement Retrogresses,' The Japan Times, May 24, I979· However, the malapportionment of seats in the House ofRepresentatives and the less-powerful House of Councilors under the Public Office Election Law is an unresolved constitutional problem the political parties have chosen not to solve by legislative action. In 1976, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the distribution of lower house seats in 1972. 113 The degree of malapportionment was against ,requirements for equality under the law and universal adult suffrage, and against the prohibition on discrimination against any particular candidates for public office.
114 (Candidates, for example, who must get twice as many votes as candidates in another district in order to be elected are suffering a form of discrimination.) But the court invalidated neither the election nor the subsequent actions of the malapportioned Diet, as requested by the plaintiffs. In 1975 the Diet added twenty seats, bringing the total to 5 I I ; 11 5 but the apportionment as of the December 1976 general elections were also challenged, in two cases decided in 1978. The first decision, handed down by the Tokyo high court,
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upheld the constitutionality of the apportionment; while the second, much more widely supported, 117 struck it down as a violation of the Article 14 requirement of equality under the law. Both holdings were on appeal to the Supreme Court before October, I 979, when the next lower house election was held. 118 The apportionment as of the I979 elections was challenged, and the apportionment as of the subsequentjune 22, I98o elections is also expected to be challenged. Some LDP leaders have expressed their disagreement with the 'one man-one vote' thinking behind the I976 and I978 judgments of unconstitutionality and the repeated challenges; but opposition politicians also see a threat to their political positions in change. 119 In September I 978, the apportionment caused discrepancies in the effective weight of a vote, depending on election district, ranging up to 3· 74 to I in the lower house and 5·3 I to I in the upper house, with I representing the minimum weight. 120 The interplay of the Supreme Court and the Diet on the malapportionment issue will merit close attention in the I 98os.
In addition, a November I979 district court decision raised the spectre of japan's imperial past in sentencing two radicals to death for killing eight and injuring close to 200 people in a series of bombings between I972 and I975, and for plotting the assassination of the Emperor. Although neither law nor constitution recognizes any difference between attempted murder of the Emperor and of an ordinary citizen, the presiding judge raised political hackles by suggesting, to many, a basic difference in holding the conspirators 'had a firm intent to assassinate the Emperor, the symbol of the unity of the people ofjapan, with bombs.' that he was a free man, dedicated to liberty. And I still remember being deeply impressed by Martin Luther King, when he raised a vision for all mankind and said, 'I have a dream.' For man to be free and at peace with his neighbors. /have a dream that the day will come when I shall be able to say to the world at large, 'Ich bin ein Japaner.' And the world will know that such is a man who tries to keep his liberty through peaceful means.
